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here are two mutually exclusive hypotheses inherent to
Putnam’s doctrine of meaning. On the one hand Putnam privileges a form of scientific realism in determining the correct application of our use of natural-kind
terms. On the other hand Putnam offers a Wittgensteinian externalist hypothesis, claiming that “[o]ur talk of apples and fields is
intimately connected with our non-verbal transactions with apples and fields.”1 The first hypothesis I will dub Putnam’s
‘Semantic Scientism’ hypothesis; the second as his externalism
hypothesis.
It is my intention in this paper to illustrate the tension between these two hypotheses, and ultimately, to assert that without the externalism hypothesis Putnam’s semantic theory is
grossly incomplete. With the externalism hypothesis, Putnam
cannot hold to what I have called his ‘Semantic Scientism’.
Though I have given a novel name to Putnam’s first thesis (the
‘Semantic Scientism’ hypothesis), I am far from the first to discuss the thesis. A similar thesis was attributed to Putnam by
Gregory McCulloch in his book The Mind and Its World.
McCulloch calls this thesis the doctrine that the ‘understanding
tracks real-essence’. Although I disagree with the explanation
McCulloch gives for this phenomenon, I do believe that Putnam
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holds to some form of this doctrine. Thus, in order to introduce
what I take to be Putnam’s theory of meaning, I will summarize
the main points McCulloch highlights concerning Putnam’s semantic doctrine.
The “understanding tracks real essence” doctrine that
McCulloch employs the Lockean distinction between real and
nominal essence in an effort to characterize Putnam’s semantic
doctrine, and I will follow suit. For Locke, the nominal essence
of, say, lead, “is the cluster of superficial qualities by which we
typically recognize something to be lead.”2 Lockean real essence,
on the other hand, “is the hidden structure which causes samples
of lead to have the superficial qualities they do have.”3 Locke
invokes a gap between the mind’s idea about a substance and the
real essence of a substance. Under a Lockean account, “what
makes something a sample of a particular substance is that it
should answer to the substance’s nominal essence.”4 That is, we do
not
rank and sort things…by their real essences, because… our faculties carry us no further towards
the knowledge and distinctions of substances than
a collection of those sensible ideas which we observe in them.5
Thus, for Locke, we rank and sort things according to what is
sensible to us, namely, our ideas of their nominal essence. There
is, however, a problem with such a conception once we examine
what our understanding of a substance-term is supposed to include. On Locke’s account we are limited to our ideas of nominal essence to rank, sort, and understand substance-terms, when
what a substance’s essence really includes is something beyond
our grasp. McCulloch characterizes the problem for Locke as not
depending the fact that a substance’s real essence is unknown to us,
but rather in the fact that our understanding of a substance-term
is “self-contained” with respect to its real essence:
in the precise sense that the facts about the under-
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standing (the entertaining of ideas of the nominal
essence) can remain the way they are in themselves whatever the facts about real essence, and
even, indeed, if there are no real essences at all.6
Thus for Locke, only ideas before one’s mind, ideas constituting
a substance’s nominal essence, can contribute to one’s understanding of a substance-term. In Putnam’s terms, only our stereotype determines or contributes to our understanding of a substance-term.
Here is where Putnam and Locke first differ: Putnam
claims that something’s fitting the stereotype (nominal essence)
of a substance is neither necessary nor sufficient for being a sample
of that substance. Given that we could have atypical samples of
a given substance which do not fit the stereotype (but are still the
same substance), and different substances that fit the same
stereotype, it seems we cannot rely on the stereotype to determine what substance a given sample is. According to Putnam,
what determines whether something is a sample of a given substance is its real essence. Putnam claims that “what we understand, say, ‘water’ to apply to” is that which has water’s real essence.7 Thus, we understand something to be water “if and only
if it has water’s real essence”, not if it has the same nominal essence, or stereotype as water.8 McCulloch characterizes this part
of Putnam’s program by saying that “the understanding tracks real
essence.”9
To flesh out the rest of Putnam’s program we need to examine his influential ‘Twin Earth’ thought experiment.
McCulloch claims that this thought experiment is supposed to
illustrate that something’s “fitting the stereotype [of a given substance] is not sufficient to be a sample of [that] substance…
because what happen to be different substances may have the
same stereotype.”10 Putnam’s thought experiment may indeed
illustrate this point. His thought experiment does not illustrate
why we should privilege scientific classifications in determining
what we mean by our use of a given term. It is my contention
that we are given no support for what I have dubbed his
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‘Semantic Scientism’ hypothesis.
The Meaning of ‘Meaning’
The crux of the Twin Earth thought experiment presents
us with a dilemma. We are asked to consider someone using the
term ‘water’ in an attempt to speak about a substance that superficially resembles (or has the same nominal essence as) a glass of
water, but in this imagined case the substance in the glass is micro-chemically distinct from the substance that we call ‘water’.
Putnam claims that the use of the term ‘water’ in this case would
be incorrect. Instead of our old, familiar H2O, Putnam has us
imagine a substance (twater) with a vastly different chemical
structure (abbreviated as ‘XYZ’) which fills the role on Twin
Earth that water plays here on Earth. According to Putnam, we
ought to sweep superficial similarities aside and adopt the view
that someone from our planet visiting Twin Earth would mean
and understand something different than Twin Earthians by the
term ‘water’. Putnam presents his program succinctly in the following passage:
My ‘ostensive definition’ of water has the following empirical presupposition: that the body of liquid I am pointing to bears a certain sameness relation (say, x is the same liquid as y, or x is the sameL as
y) to most of the stuff I and other speakers in my
linguistic community have on other occasions
called ‘water.’11
The mere fact that Twin Earthians use a word that superficially
resembles our term ‘water’ to speak about a substance that superficially resembles H2O is not enough to constitute the Twin
Earth term ‘water’ as referring to actual water. Putnam drives
home this point about ‘resemblance’ in “brains in a vat” with his
discussion of an ant tracing lines in the sand that resemble a caricature of Winston Churchill. But, he states, “[t]he mere fact that
the ‘picture’ bears a ‘resemblance’ to Churchill does not make it
into a real picture, nor does it make it a representation of Chur-
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chill.”12 Resemblance to a representation is not sufficient for representation. Or, in Putnam’s terminology, “qualitative similarity
to something which represents an object…does not make a thing
a representation all by itself.”13
At this point it may seem as though what accounts for
how a substance term refers to a given substance’s real essence is
intention.14 McCulloch perpetuates this idea when summarizing
Putnam’s position as follows,
[A]ccording to Putnam, we intend our substancewords to make classifications which are sensitive
to the regularities exhibited by these underlying
[real essence] factors…[n]ot that we (or anyone)
need know what these are.15
McCulloch traces the different understandings of ‘water’ for
Earthians and Twin Earthians to a difference in the intentions of
language users in our two worlds. Or as McCulloch puts it, “Our
intentions concerning the word ‘water; exclude XYZ and include
H2O, theirs do the opposite.”16
But Putnam does not claim this, as for obvious reasons it
seems impossible that one could intend something without being
able to think about it. As Putnam states:
to have the intention that anything, even private
language (even the words ‘Winston Churchill’
spoken in my mind and not out loud), should represent Churchill, I must have been able to think
about Churchill in the first place.17
In short, what propositional attitudes like intentions ‘track’ depends on what our thoughts represent. What our thoughts represent depends on what the words specifying those thoughts
represent. So what those words represent cannot depend on
what our intentions track without circularity. The dependence
must go the other way around.

40

Gregory R. Warner

Semantic Scientism, Scientific Realism, and Linguistic Communities
So what, according to Putnam, accounts for the supposed
fact that our understanding tracks real essence? This is not at all
clear.
McCulloch and Putnam seem to conflate two independent points. McCulloch states that according to Putnam what determines whether something is a sample of a given substance is its
real essence. McCulloch then commits a non-sequitor, and counts
this claim as implying that “what…we understand ‘water’ to apply to” is only samples with water’s real essence.18 Even if we
grant Putnam and McCulloch the claim that something’s fitting
the stereotype (having the same nominal essence) of a given substance is neither necessary nor sufficient for that something to be
a sample of a substance, and we grant the supposition that to be
a sample of a given substance, that sample must have the same
real essence as the given substance, it does not follow that we would
understand ‘water’ to apply only to samples with the real essence H2O.
Putnam concedes that “A and B can be syntactically and phonetically the same word in two different languages (or in two different dialects or idiolects of the same language) and yet have different reference.”19 This isn’t to reduce the debate to the level of
syntax or phonetics, but to elucidate the point Putnam conceded
earlier: resemblance to a representation is not sufficient for representation.
Why are we committed to scientific realism to determine
the meaning (and correct application) of our terms? Perhaps in
matters where scientific classification is relevant for determining
what things are, we can rely on science. But science has no authority in terms of classification when we are speaking of manufactured (or social) kinds, i.e. chairs, and gloves. Rather, chairs
have no real essence; only a nominal essence. What does understanding track in the case of manufactured kinds? I am assuming here that Putnam’s externalist theory of understanding must
accommodate kinds other than natural-kinds, as it seems that
later in his work, he requires the adoption of this assumption –
‘vats’ are not a natural-kind, but his argument for why “I am a
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brain in a vat” is self-defeating applies his externalism to the
word ‘vat.’20
To elucidate the contrast between Putnam’s semantic approach to social-kind terms and natural-kind terms, consider two
examples from Representation and Reality: the terms ‘bonnet’ and
‘robin’. Putnam considers both terms as used in British English
and American English. ‘Bonnet’, Putnam states,
is phonetically (and in spelling) the same words in
American English and in British English, but in
British English ‘bonnet’ can denote the hood of a
car, whereas it cannot in American English.21
The situation is similar in the case of ‘robin’, where the term
“does not refer to the same species of bird in England and in the
United States.”22 In this latter case, presumably the reason why
‘robin’ as uttered on the lips of an Englishman does not refer to
the same species as when the same term is uttered on the lips of
an American, is because there are different species of bird in England and the United States which are called by the same term:
‘robin’. All of this is simply to reiterate Putnam’s earlier point
that phonetic and syntactic similarity of terms (or even in this
case where the terms are identical phonetically and syntactically)
is not sufficient for co-extension.
What is interesting is the explanation as to how the terms
‘robin’ and ‘bonnet’ as uttered in the United States and in Britain
are supposed to have different (respective) extensions. In the
case of ‘robin’, Putnam can (in his explanation of its reference)
default to his linguistic division of labour. Putnam claims that
we can rely on “experts” in our linguistic community to be able
to understand natural-kind terms, such that my use of a naturalkind term like ‘water’ means H2O and not XYZ, even though I
might not know water’s real essence. In this vein, Putnam claims
that his use of the terms ‘beech’ and ‘elm’ have different meanings in his linguistic community (and he claims he understands
the term) even if he cannot tell the difference between the two
types of tree. Putnam characterizes the program succinctly in the
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following passage.
Every linguistic community…possesses at least
some terms whose acquainted ‘criteria’ are known
only to a subset of the speakers who acquire the
terms, and whose use by the other speakers depends upon a structured cooperation between
them and the speakers in the relevant subset… In
case of doubt, other speakers would rely on the
judgment of these ‘expert’ speakers.23
Though ‘robin’ could presumably be considered a natural-kind
term, in the case of ‘bonnet’, all we have to fix the reference of
the term in our respective communities is the linguistic doings of
others in our linguistic communities. We cannot default to real
essence (or experts acquainted with real essence) to fix the reference of a term like ‘bonnet’, as the reference for such a term is
constituted by the use to which others in one’s linguistic community give to it. But here it seems as though Putnam’s scientific
realism is not doing any work in determining the meaning of our
terms; the work is done by the linguistic practices of others
whether or not those others speak the language of science, and
whether or not they are speaking of scientific (natural) kinds or
manufactured kinds.
This produces a strange problem. To be clear, Putnam is
claiming that we can rely on a special subclass of speakers within
our linguistic community to fix the meaning of a natural-kind
term to a particular substance’s real essence, and for manufactured kinds, the meaning of our terms is determined by the “the
use of a word by other speakers” in our community.24 My question is this: how do we differentiate between those people who
are members of our linguistic community but who consistently
use a term incorrectly, and those who are speaking a different
language or dialect, (and so, presumably belong to a different
linguistic community)? Wittgenstein claimed that there was no
difference between these two options, which thus spawned certain rule-following problems. A relevant criticism of Putnam
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arises once we realize that we fail to make any real distinction
here. Where do we draw the boundary surrounding our linguistic community?25
Furthermore, Putnam expresses his externalism with the
Wittgensteinian claim that “[o]ur talk of apples and fields is intimately connected with our non-verbal transactions with apples
and fields.”26 Why should we assume that Putnam’s non-verbal
transactions with beeches and elms are different transactions,
when he can’t tell the difference between the two? Given that
Putnam cannot tell the difference between elms and beeches, we
must assume that his non-verbal transactions with beeches are
no different than his non-verbal transactions with elms. It would
seem that if we held Putnam to this Wittgensteinian claim, then
his use of the terms ‘elm’ and ‘beech’ would have the same extension. Understanding, in the case of Putnam’s understanding of
‘elm’ and ‘beech’, does not track real essence.
At this point it might be objected that if it is the case that
Putnam’s use of ‘elm’ and ‘beech’ have the same extension, this
is not due to the fact that the understanding does not track real
essence. Putnam’s use of ‘elm’ and ‘beech’ having the same extension, while holding to Semantic Scientism, is ipso facto reason
to deny that Putnam understands the terms ‘elm’ and ‘beech’.
What we have here, as the objection might be presented, is a case
of misunderstanding, and what the understanding tracks in the
case of misunderstanding is irrelevant to Putnam’s Semantic Scientism hypothesis.
However, the contrast between using the terms “with understanding” and “misunderstanding” the terms simply reinstates the contrast between correct and incorrect usage of the
terms. We cannot adjudicate between a speaker’s correct and
incorrect uses by appeal to the verbal practices of a linguistic
community without first assigning that speaker to the right linguistic community. The point of my objection is that Putnam has
no criterion for making such assignments, and so no basis for a
contrast between misspeaking and using a word with a different
meaning. He certainly has no criterion that compels us to assign
him to the same linguistic community as those botanical experts
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who – by his own admission – use their words “beech” and
“elm” so very differently than Putnam uses his words “beech”
and “elm”. Putnam’s view that meaning is determined by our
nonverbal transactions with objects is thus in tension with his
Semantic Scientism, which supposes the role that our own uses
of words has in determining their meanings is to be over-ridden
by the uses of the same-sounding words by others.
Putnam’s ‘Beech-Elm’
Putnam assumes a fixed meaning within his linguistic
community for ‘elm’ and ‘beech’, such that his being a member
of that community guarantees that his use of ‘elm’ means elm
and not beech. But this assumption is in tension with his Wittgensteinian claim that “talk of [elms and beeches] is intimately
connected with our non-verbal transactions with” elms and
beeches.27 Putnam resolves this tension by relying on the nonverbal transactions with elms and beeches of other people in his
linguistic community to fix the meaning of the terms ‘elm’ and
‘beech’. But to assume a fixed meaning for the terms, Putnam is
required to assume that his conception of a linguistic community
is coherent – something which has not demonstrated.
It would seem that Putnam’s Semantic Scientism hypothesis has a number of problems. His Twin Earth thought experiment is supposed to push us towards the intuition that,
given the discovery that what we Earthians call ‘water’ is chemically different from what the Twin Earthians call ‘water’, we
ought to say that our two cultures mean different things by
‘water’. But why would we not at this point of discovery say
that ‘water’ is actually two substances: XYZ and H2O? Putnam
does not seem to provide a relevant reason for rejecting this
equally plausible option.
I accept Putnam’s Wittgensteinian claim that what the
term ‘water’ means is intimately connected with our non-verbal
transactions with water. Holding to this claim, why should we
assume that the meaning of a natural-kind term is any different
than any other term used outside the practice of science? While
‘water’ may be correctly applied within the practice of science to
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samples of H2O only, someone using the term ‘water’ outside of
the practice of science isn’t held to the semantic standards set by
those in the practice of science. Chemists may be experts concerning the chemistry of water, but their usage of the term has no
privileged status vis-à-vis the meaning of “water”. Recall Putnam’s discussion of an ant tracing lines in the sand, where he
states, “qualitative similarity to something which represents [a
substance] does not make that thing a representation all by itself.”28 Why should we assume that qualitative similarity to a
representation employed in science constitutes a term as being a
representation of the same thing?
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